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SYMPOSIUM ： Risk, Disaster ＆ Crisis Studies
摘
要：
When man - made disasters take place, local governments in China often conceal critical information from the central government in order to shirk responsibilities. Punishment for concealment is widely believed to be an effective way to curb such behaviors. However, is this still the case if we take the cost of information acquisition into account？ Using a model of game theory, this article analyzes local governments＇ information acquisition and disclosure strategies. It also explores the processes of responsibility evaluation and punishment imposition by the central government. We find that while harsher punishment can have a chilling effect on information concealment, it may also discourage local governments from acquiring information. As a result, less information is collected and less will be reported to the Center. Hence, when stipulating punishment on information concealment, the central government must consider its negative consequences for information acquisition.
来
源：
关
键
词：
《公共行政评论》; 英文摘要; 期刊; 编辑工作
中图分类号[机标]：
G353.23 [文摘]
学科分类号[机标]：
1205 [信息资源管理]
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